

Win For Women or Dynasties?

Consequences of Gender Quotas in Taiwan

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Abstract

This article examines how gender quotas reshape political selection and substantive representation, advancing a supply-side theory of quota effects and challenging the placeholder view of dynastic women. Using a regression discontinuity design in Taiwan's local council elections, I show that quota implementation increases women's descriptive representation while raising the dynastic share of elected councilors. This reflects strategic party adaptation to supply constraints. When competitive women candidates are scarce, parties draw disproportionately from women with family ties. In contrast to previous work suggesting that dynastic women prioritize family interests over independent advocacy, I find that expanding women's descriptive representation through dynastic women involves no tradeoff with substantive representation, since quota-induced dynastic entry does not undermine the representation of women's interests. Districts exposed to quotas produce significantly more women-related bills and speeches, and dynastic status does not attenuate women's legislative engagement. These findings suggest that quota effects depend not only on institutional design but on the pre-existing structure of candidate supply.

Keywords: Gender Quota, Political Dynasty, Descriptive Representation, Substantive Representation, Regression Discontinuity

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1 Introduction

More than one hundred countries now use gender quotas to increase women’s access to office ([Krook, 2009](#); [Wängnerud, 2009](#); [Verge and Wiesehomeier, 2019](#)), and a large literature asks whether these measures improve women’s descriptive or substantive representation ([Mansbridge, 2003](#); [O’Brien and Piscopo, 2019](#)). Yet quotas may also affect representation by changing which women enter office. Because they intervene directly in candidate selection, whether a larger numerical presence also strengthens advocacy for women’s interests depends on who these women are.

This article develops a supply-side account of quota effects, one in which their consequences depend on the pre-existing pool of electorally competitive women. Parties facing a quota requirement need women who can win, and winning requires electoral assets such as name recognition, campaign finance, and local organizational support. The quota changes the gender requirement for nominations, but parties still look for candidates with the same electoral advantages, so the key constraint is the limited pool of women who already possess these assets. Where electoral systems reward personal votes, family ties are a particularly durable source of them ([Carey and Shugart, 1995](#); [Dal Bó et al., 2009](#); [Querubín, 2016](#); [Geys and Smith, 2017](#)), and parties act as gatekeepers who favor candidates embedded in such networks ([Hazan and Rahat, 2010](#)). Few women outside political families can draw on assets of this kind, so quotas tend to benefit those who can, many of whom come from political dynasties. A growing body of research confirms that quota adoption reshapes party strategy and elite composition beyond simply increasing the number of women elected ([Karekurve-Ramachandra and Lee, 2020](#); [Folke et al., 2021](#)).

Although previous studies examine which types of women gain office under quotas, they remain within the domain of descriptive representation. A large literature does

examine what women do once elected and generally finds that quotas raise substantive representation (Hughes et al., 2017; Clayton and Zetterberg, 2018; Weeks, 2019; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Wang, 2023), but it treats the women a quota brings in as interchangeable, so it cannot speak to whether the type of woman who enters office matters for what she does. When elected women hold multiple politically relevant identities, which identity shapes their behavior in office? The question is pointed in the case of dynastic women, since dynastic politicians are commonly seen as actors embedded within existing hierarchies rather than reformers (Smith, 2018), so a quota that seats more of them may deliver less for women’s interests than its numbers suggest. Research on women political leaders finds that those who enter office through family ties or proxy arrangements are not automatically advocates for women’s rights (Jalalzai, 2013; Labonne et al., 2019; Bhowmick, 2026). A conventional expectation follows, namely that if quotas increase the election of dynastic women, gains in descriptive representation may coexist with limited progress in advancing women’s substantive interests.

There are reasons to doubt this expectation. The same competitive pressures that channel dynastic women into office also give them incentives to demonstrate responsiveness to women’s interests, so their entry need not come at the expense of advocacy. Existing research evaluates quota effects mainly through institutional design, party competition, or electoral systems (Clayton, 2021; Meguid et al., 2025), and pays less attention to the candidate supply that these institutions act upon. Adjudicating between these possibilities requires observing both who quotas seat and what they do once in office.

To do so, I study Taiwan’s local council elections, where institutional rules create a natural source of exogenous variation. Taiwan reserves at least one seat for women in constituencies electing four or more councilors, and district magnitude is determined by

a statutory population formula. As a result, otherwise similar constituencies can differ in whether an additional quota seat is activated. This feature allows for a regression discontinuity design that identifies the causal effects of quota activation on both candidate composition and legislative behavior.¹ In practice the reserved seat rarely binds, since most elected women out-poll enough rivals to win a seat outright (Table A2), so the women a quota brings in face the same electoral accountability as other councilors.

I show that quota activation substantially increases women’s descriptive representation while also raising the dynastic share of elected councilors. At the same time, original data on council bills and floor speeches indicate that these changes do not reduce substantive advocacy. Districts exposed to quotas produce significantly more women-related bills and speeches, and this increase is driven primarily by women councilors. Dynastic status, moreover, does not diminish women legislators’ engagement with women-related issues. Among male councilors, quota exposure generates a spillover effect that increases engagement with women’s issues, though this response is significantly attenuated among dynastic men.

The paper makes three contributions. First, it adds a prior question to the long-running debate over whether more women in office produces more advocacy for women, namely which women a quota seats. Work on Taiwan asks whether quotas convert descriptive gains into substantive representation (Wang, 2023), but it studies the closed party lists of the national legislature, where leaders select nominees who face no district electorate, and it treats the women quotas bring in as homogeneous. Local councilors must assemble personal votes, which is where the supply constraint binds, and I show that the answer does not hinge on elite background in the way commonly assumed. Second, it identifies a setting in which dynastic entry coincides with stronger rather than

¹ The term “local council” refers here to municipality, city, and county councils.

weaker issue advocacy, cutting against the view of inherited power as a vehicle of elite entrenchment. Third, it moves the explanation of variation in quota effects from rules and electoral systems to the candidate supply those rules act upon. This extends work showing that quotas can raise the competence of the elected by displacing less competitive men ([Besley et al., 2017](#)), since in my setting parties meet the constraint by fielding the strongest available women, who in Taiwan are disproportionately dynastic.

The next section reviews the relevant literature and develops the theoretical argument. Subsequent sections describe the empirical setting and data, present the main results, and conclude.

2 Candidate Supply, Elite Recruitment, and Quota Effects

2.1 Descriptive and Substantive Representation

Numerous studies have documented improvements in women’s descriptive representation following the adoption of gender quotas ([Tripp and Kang, 2008](#); [Jones, 2009](#); [Paxton and Hughes, 2015](#); [Dahlerup, 2013](#); [Hughes, 2011](#); [Krook, 2009](#)). Although many of these studies find positive effects on women’s legislative presence, the magnitude of these effects varies with the design of quota rules and the timing of their implementation. For example, [Paxton and Hughes \(2015\)](#) shows that reserved seat quotas, which guarantee a minimum share of seats for women, are more effective in increasing women’s representation than candidate quotas that regulate only the composition of party lists. This work also demonstrates that the positive impact of quotas on descriptive representation strengthens over time as norms surrounding women’s political inclusion change. [Schwindt-Bayer \(2009\)](#) fur-

ther identifies several institutional features that shape quota effectiveness, including the required proportion of women candidates, the placement of women in electable positions on party lists, and the presence of sanctions for noncompliance.

Another important question is whether gender quotas consistently motivate politicians to advocate for more women-friendly or gender-equal policies. As previous studies have shown, men and women politicians often hold different policy preferences ([Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004](#); [Beaman et al., 2009](#)). Thus, an increase in the number of women politicians may shift the policy agenda. Most existing studies find that the introduction of quotas can enhance the substantive representation of women ([Hughes et al., 2017](#); [Wängnerud, 2009](#); [Pearson and Dancey, 2011](#); [Celis, 2007](#); [Dodson, 2006](#); [Esaiasson and Heidar, 2000](#); [Hogan, 2008](#); [Reingold, 1992](#); [Swers, 2002](#); [Thomas, 1994](#); [Carey et al., 1998](#); [Clayton and Zetterberg, 2018](#); [Weeks, 2019](#); [Wang, 2023](#); [Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004](#)).

There are several explanations for how quotas influence substantive representation. [Clayton \(2021\)](#) argues that increasing the number of women can either enhance the flow of information or allow women to play a more essential role in decision-making bodies. The “providing more information” mechanism refers not only to the idea that having more women in councils increases overall awareness of women-related issues but also to the effect that the presence of more women motivates male councilors to recognize the need to care about these issues as well. Underlying both channels is the premise that women are more likely to advocate for women’s interests because shared life experiences give them a deeper understanding of women’s needs and perspectives ([Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008](#); [Wängnerud, 2000](#); [Wängnerud, 2009](#)).

The “essential role” mechanism means that when women hold key positions in councils or parties, they gain greater power over agenda-setting, which enables them to prioritize

legislation related to women’s issues. [Chattopadhyay and Duflo \(2004\)](#)’s study provides empirical evidence for this mechanism. They examine the consequences of mandated representation of women in Indian village council leadership. When women serve as village council heads, they tend to prioritize different types of public goods, such as drinking water and roads, compared with their male counterparts.

However, some studies indicate that a rise in descriptive representation does not necessarily result in greater substantive representation. For example, [Weeks and Masala \(2023\)](#) argue that a higher proportion of women in Italian parliament does not automatically translate into substantive policy change, largely due to structural barriers within the policymaking process that limit their ability to represent women’s interests effectively. [Bailer et al. \(2021\)](#) find that the policy priorities of politicians who represent marginalized groups may shift over time. For example, women politicians often focus on women-related issues early in their careers, possibly due to career advancement incentives. As their professional goals evolve, their areas of focus may also change. It remains unclear whether growth in descriptive representation results in greater substantive representation, especially when the descriptive representation of political groups other than women is affected simultaneously.

2.2 Quotas and Elite Composition

Gender quotas may also impact the representation of other politically significant traits, in addition to gender representation. Some existing studies find that political gender quotas may decrease minority representation ([Karekurve-Ramachandra and Lee, 2020](#); [Holmsten et al., 2010](#); [Cassan and Vandewalle, 2021](#); [Celis et al., 2014](#)). Those effects can arise from the strategic responses of politicians or from the choices made by voters.

Research on intersectionality highlights that women are not a homogeneous group, and quota reforms may disproportionately benefit candidates with closer ties to dominant social groups. As a result, increases in women's representation may coincide with declines in the representation of other communities. These distributional shifts show that quotas can reallocate political power beyond gender and can also reshape the representation of other social groups, potentially reinforcing pre-existing inequalities.

For example, [Karekurve-Ramachandra and Lee \(2020\)](#) examine the elections in India and find that women from upper castes are more likely to win reserved seats. Hence, the quotas also contribute to an imbalance in the representation of different castes. This result is mainly driven by the socioeconomic status of women in the group and the attitudes of individuals within the same group towards women. [Folke et al. \(2021\)](#) document another form of identity-based representation change resulting from the introduction of gender quotas in Sweden and Ireland. They find that women with dynastic ties are more likely to be elected in the initial election following quota implementation, particularly in districts with fewer women representatives. However, this effect is short-lived. After several elections, voters no longer rely on dynastic cues because they develop clearer expectations about competitive women candidates. The authors attribute this pattern to screening discrimination, which historically made it more difficult for women than for men to receive accurate evaluations. In the early stages of quota implementation, family ties serve as an informational cue that helps voters overcome this uncertainty.

These findings raise the question of where in the electoral process the shift occurs. The screening account locates the mechanism on the demand side, in what voters infer from a family name when choosing among the candidates on offer. A supply-side account locates it earlier, in which women parties put on the ballot in the first place. The two are

partly distinguishable by the stage at which dynastic entry appears. If voters are doing the selecting, the quota should raise the dynastic share of those elected without raising it among candidates, since the effect would work through the relative success of dynastic women in a given pool. If parties are doing the selecting, the shift should be visible already at the nomination stage. The distinction is not airtight, because parties may field dynastic women precisely in anticipation of how voters will respond, but evidence at the nomination stage would rule out the narrower reading in which voters alone reshape the composition of women in office.

Although [Folke et al. \(2021\)](#)’s research mainly focuses on Ireland and Sweden, they also identify similar declining patterns of dynastic bias across many other democracies. However, it remains unclear how contextual differences, such as party-centered versus candidate-centered electoral systems, mediate the relationship between gender and dynastic recruitment. Previous studies argue that candidate-centered systems are more likely to produce dynastic politicians ([Carey and Shugart, 1995](#); [Smith, 2018](#)), yet the gender composition of political dynasties remains understudied. This gap motivates a closer examination of how dynastic politics intersect with gender under different institutional settings.

2.3 Does Dynastic Entry Undermine Substantive Representation?

Political dynasties are often viewed as normatively problematic because the inheritance of political power runs counter to democratic principles of political equality and open competition ([Putnam, 1976](#)). Dynastic politics reflects a self-perpetuating process among political elites, which may undermine democratic accountability when political office is

effectively transferred within families. These concerns extend to descriptive representation as well. Because dynastic recruitment concentrates access to office within a small set of families, it raises entry barriers for aspirants without political connections and narrows the range of backgrounds represented in office (Dal Bó et al., 2009; Querubín, 2016).

Beyond these normative concerns, scholars argue that dynastic politicians tend to be less educated, a pattern that can lead to a range of negative consequences, including inferior public policies, weaker political effort, and greater reliance on clientelistic strategies for electoral survival (Geys, 2017; Geys and Smith, 2017; Bragança et al., 2015; Rossi, 2017; Cruz et al., 2017; Chandra, 2016). These concerns are echoed in public opinion. Survey evidence from Taiwan indicates that citizens generally hold negative perceptions of political dynasties (Huang, 2024). When voters elect incompetent politicians, the consequences may persist over extended periods as political power is inherited by family members, further exacerbating concerns about democratic quality.

While political dynasties are often viewed as normatively problematic, family connections have also played an important role in facilitating women’s entry into politics. Numerous “widow’s succession” cases occurred in the United States during the early twentieth century, in which women entered politics by inheriting their husbands’ positions upon their deaths (Dal Bó et al., 2009). This pattern is also observed in authoritarian regimes. Clark and Clark (2000) note that in authoritarian-era Taiwan, running for office as a family member of a political victim became an important pathway for women to enter politics. Women emerged in public life as widows, daughters, or other relatives of persecuted activists, taking on temporary leadership roles within social movements and helping to sustain the momentum of political opposition (Waylen, 1996). As a result, their entry into politics was often driven by necessity rather than personal ambition, and their polit-

ical agendas tended to be relatively passive. Given that women’s political participation historically occurred primarily through family networks and under conditions of limited political opportunity, it is not surprising that dynastic women are sometimes viewed as “placeholders”. The de facto power of these women is often constrained by familial expectations ([Labonne et al., 2019](#); [Jalalzai, 2013](#)).

Although Taiwan’s democratic consolidation has transformed the institutional context, the legacy of family-mediated political succession means that dynastic women politicians continue to be viewed with skepticism. When gender quotas create new incentives for parties to recruit female relatives of established politicians, the same placeholder concern re-emerges in a new institutional guise. This concern is not unique to Taiwan. In other democracies, male politicians have recruited female relatives to satisfy quota requirements while retaining political power within the family, with these women expected to prioritize family interests over independent political agendas. For example, several studies show that in India, male relatives of women politicians frequently usurp political roles that quota systems were designed to reserve for women ([Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004](#); [John, 2007](#); [Huidobro et al., 2025](#)).

The placeholder role is widely assumed but rarely tested. Whether women who enter politics on a family name continue the agendas of their predecessors or develop independent priorities is an open question, and because their pathways into office differ from those of their peers, dynastic women may also differ from other women in the issues they pursue ([Smith, 2018](#)). Answering this requires evidence on how dynastic women, non-dynastic women, and women legislators as a whole behave under gender quotas.

2.4 A Supply-Side Theory of Quota Effects

According to previous literature, during Taiwan’s authoritarian era there emerged a tradition known as “Chiashu Campaigns” ([Clark and Clark, 2000](#)), in which female relatives of political prisoners, including wives, daughters, and other kin, stood for election in place of their imprisoned male family members. This practice reflected a broader form of family-based politics under authoritarian rule, whereby women entered electoral competition as representatives of politically persecuted families rather than as autonomous political actors.

After democratization, imprisonment of political dissidents ceased to be a feature of electoral politics, but the logic of family-mediated political succession persisted and diversified. Family members may step in when male politicians are unable to run because of criminal incarceration, health conditions, or other personal reasons. In some cases, family politics takes the form of joint or overlapping political careers, with spouses or parent–child pairs simultaneously or sequentially holding elected office. These patterns suggest that the mobilization of family members to sustain political representation has remained an enduring feature of Taiwanese politics, even as the institutional context has changed.

Notably, entering politics through family substitution does not preclude the development of independent political agendas. [Chiang \(2009\)](#) shows that many women who initially entered politics unintentionally went on to cultivate their own policy priorities over time. As I will show in a later section, some dynastic women politicians in Taiwan diverge from their male predecessors by shifting their policy focus, indicating that the placeholder role does not universally apply, particularly in the democratic era.

In addition to political family, parties also have strategic motivations for selecting

dynastic women as candidates. Consider a situation in which parties compete in a constituency with four seats, where institutional rules guarantee that at least one of the four winners must be a woman. Parties choose both the number and gender composition of their nominees to maximize expected seat shares. Crucially, the quota operates as a minimum guarantee rather than a cap, so women candidates may win more than one seat if their vote shares place them among the top four.

In this environment, nominating at least one woman constitutes a weakly dominant strategy for the following reasons. If a party nominates only men and the quota binds, the guaranteed seat for women is awarded to the highest-vote woman candidate from a rival party, mechanically reducing the party's expected seat share. By contrast, nominating a woman candidate preserves the party's ability to compete for quota-induced seats without reducing its chances of winning non-reserved seats. However, strategic logic does not imply that parties benefit from nominating arbitrarily weak women candidates. Because rival parties face the same incentives, quota-induced competition typically takes the form of cross-party competition among women candidates. When each party nominates a woman, the quota no longer guarantees election to any particular party, and the seat is allocated to the woman with the highest vote total across all parties.

The required competitiveness of a party's sole woman nominee depends on strategic competition with rival parties ([Batto, 2019](#)). A woman candidate who is substantially weaker than the party's marginal male contender may still be sufficient as a symbolic or insurance nomination. However, this strategy is unstable at equilibrium. If the quota binds, a weak woman nominee is likely to lose to a stronger woman nominee from the rival party. If the quota does not bind, she is unlikely to place among the top four candidates on her own merits and may further dilute intra-party votes. Anticipating these responses,

parties are incentivized to nominate a woman whose electoral competitiveness approaches that of the party's marginally winnable candidate. In equilibrium, nominating exactly one woman is optimal only if her electoral competitiveness is high enough to outperform rival parties' women nominees when the quota binds and is not substantially weaker than the party's marginally winnable male candidate when the quota does not bind.

This logic also clarifies when parties may optimally nominate more than one woman candidate. A second woman nomination is seat-maximizing only if the additional woman candidate is strong enough to enter the top four independently, offsetting the vote-splitting costs induced by an expanded party slate. Otherwise, parties rationally limit nominations of women to one, not because the quota constrains women's success, but because strategic competition raises the competitiveness threshold required for additional nominees to be elected. The model implies that gender quotas can simultaneously increase women's representation and raise the average electoral strength of nominated women candidates through strategic selection, rather than mechanical substitution.

In this context, women from political dynasties emerge as prime targets for parties seeking electorally strong women candidates. First, dynastic politicians tend to be electorally competitive in Taiwan due to the resources they inherit, including political networks, campaign experience, and family reputation ([Batto and Read, 2024](#)). Second, dynastic women candidates help parties satisfy gender quota requirements by occupying seats reserved for women. Prior research provides sporadic evidence, based on interviews with political families, suggesting that nominating women within these families is a strategic response to gender quota requirements ([Batto and Read, 2024](#)). Consistent with the descriptive patterns discussed above, women candidates are limited in supply overall, with non-dynastic women being particularly scarce relative to non-dynastic men. This imbalance implies

that when families nominate female relatives, these candidates face fewer same-gender competitors, thereby further enhancing their strategic appeal to parties. In short, gender quotas introduce an additional binding constraint by requiring parties to manage gender composition alongside electoral competitiveness. Prior to the implementation of gender quotas, reliance on dynastic women candidates was optional rather than necessary. The introduction of quotas fundamentally altered this strategic calculus.

The introduction of the gender quota law also raises the cost of candidate recruitment, as parties are often compelled to identify new, competitive women candidates. This burden is particularly pronounced for smaller parties, which tend to have more limited candidate pools and fewer resources for recruitment ([Weeks, 2018](#)). Although the law applies to all parties, those with fewer established women candidates must invest more in identifying new entrants. However, increased recruitment efforts may result in nominating candidates with limited name recognition, which can negatively affect electoral performance. For example, party officials in France anticipated electoral losses due to nominating unknown women candidates following the adoption of gender quotas ([Murray, 2007](#)).

Given that dynastic candidates are typically more electorally competitive within each gender due to inherited resources, name recognition, and established organizational bases, parties are especially inclined to nominate dynastic women once quotas apply. At the same time, quotas reduce the number of seats effectively available to male candidates. This crowding intensifies competition for the remaining male seat, leading parties to allocate it to the safest and most competitive option, which is often a dynastic man. In summary, quotas activate the nomination of dynastic women while reinforcing the selection of dynastic men through crowding. The combined effect is a systematic increase in

the overall dynastic share of party nominations. This mechanism does not imply that gender quotas enhance the intrinsic electoral strength of dynastic candidates. Rather, the rise in dynastic representation following quota adoption reflects strategic party adaptation to new institutional constraints, not changes in the underlying appeal of dynastic candidates themselves. These lead to Hypothesis 1 and 2:

Hypothesis 1 (Gender Descriptive Representation). Constituencies with gender quotas have more women candidates and councilors than constituencies without gender quotas.

Hypothesis 2 (Dynastic Descriptive Representation). Constituencies with gender quotas have more dynastic candidates and councilors than constituencies without gender quotas.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 concern who enters office. If quotas disproportionately bring dynastic women into office, the consequences may extend to what those officeholders do. Two questions follow. The first is whether quotas raise the substantive representation of women's interests at all. The second is whether that effect depends on the dynastic background of the women elected.

On the first, [Wang \(2023\)](#) finds that women elected through Taiwan's national party-list quota devote greater attention to welfare, health, and education issues than women elected without quota support. That setting differs from local councils in ways that matter here, since the national quota applies to closed party lists, where leaders select nominees who face no district electorate and where list places often go to policy specialists irrespective of gender. Local councilors must instead assemble personal votes in multimember districts, so whether quotas change behavior among candidates who win on their own

vote totals remains an open question. Quotas may do so through two channels. Mechanically, they place more women in office, and women tend to engage more with women's issues. Behaviorally, they may raise how intensively individual councilors engage. In quota districts more women run and more women hold office, so a woman seeking to hold her seat is compared against a larger field of other women rather than against men alone, and women's issues are a natural dimension on which that comparison is drawn. This logic does not require the reserved seat to bind. What the quota changes is the number of women on the ballot, since parties nominate women to avoid conceding the reserved seat to a rival, and a woman who is one of several rather than the only one cannot rely on being the default choice for voters who want a woman in office. A second behavioral possibility is that a larger and more visible group of women councilors raises the salience of women's issues on the council agenda, in which case engagement should rise among male councilors as well. Aggregate output reflects the number of seats, the composition of the elected group, and how much each councilor does. I therefore estimate the effect on aggregate output, on output per councilor, which nets out the additional seat, and at the councilor level holding gender fixed, which speaks to the behavioral channel.

Hypothesis 3 (Substantive Representation). Constituencies with gender quotas exhibit higher levels of women's substantive representation than constituencies without gender quotas.

The second question confronts the placeholder concern directly. If dynastic women serve primarily as proxies for their male relatives, their engagement with women's issues should fall short of that of non-dynastic women. The competitive logic developed above points the other way, since a dynastic woman who wins by outpolling rival women has

the same reason as any other councilor to build a visible record. I therefore state the placeholder claim as a hypothesis and test it.

Hypothesis 4 (Placeholder). Among women councilors, those from political dynasties exhibit lower substantive representation of women’s interests than non-dynastic women.

3 Gender Quotas and Political Dynasties in Taiwan

3.1 The History of Gender Quotas In Taiwan

In most countries that introduced gender quota laws, women’s representation was limited prior to reform ([Clayton, 2021](#)). Taiwan represents a slightly different case from this broader pattern. Although gender quotas existed at the local level as early as 1947, these rules were not sufficiently effective in facilitating substantial increases in women’s political participation.² In 1998, 53% of districts had no reserved seats, and 46% had only one reserved seat. Only 16% of candidates and 18% of elected councilors were women. Dissatisfaction with these outcomes, especially among feminist activists, motivated calls for reform.

To understand why earlier quotas had limited impact, it is important to situate them within Taiwan’s broader gender structure. Taiwan during the authoritarian and early post-authoritarian era remained strongly patriarchal. [Clark and Clark \(2000\)](#) document that many patriarchal norms persisted, including heavy domestic burdens on women and the enduring expectation that they serve as “virtuous wives and good mothers.” Despite

² Districts with 5 to 14 seats have one reserved seat, and districts with 15 to 24 seats have two reserved seats.

advances in education and labor-force participation, women continued to face significant gendered constraints in family responsibilities and workplace hierarchy.

Within this context, the Kuomintang (KMT) created specific organizational roles for women, most notably in the Women's League, the military system, and veterans' communities, that aligned with traditional expectations of women as caretakers and community stabilizers. Although these positions were rooted in conventional gender norms, they provided one of the few legitimate pathways for women to move from the domestic sphere into the public realm. Through such work, women were able to build organizational experience, develop extensive local networks, and accumulate political resources that later facilitated their entry into electoral politics ([Chiang, 2009](#)).

Prior to the quota reform, gender was not a salient political cleavage in Taiwan. Women were generally understood as members of other social categories rather than as a distinct political constituency with shared interests. The introduction of the quota, by increasing the visibility and numerical presence of women in councils, gradually elevated gender into a more meaningful axis of political representation.

In 1998, the national parliament began drafting a new set of local government laws. The revision of the gender quota rule became one of the key issues. The proposal was initially championed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). With the support of women's organizations, the Legislative Yuan enacted a new quota system for local councils, which was first implemented in the 2002 elections ([Hu, 2004](#); [Yang, 2000](#); [Huang, 2016](#)). The electoral system for local councilors is a Single Non-Transferable Vote with Multiple Member Districts (SNTV-MMD), meaning that constituencies often have more than one seat. The new 1/4 quota rule requires that in any constituency with four or more seats, at least one must be reserved for women. A district with eight seats has two reserved

seats, and one with twelve seats has three. If the top four vote-getters are all men, the fourth man is replaced by the highest-ranked woman. Table 1 reports the distribution of total seats and reserved seats across constituencies. More than half of the constituencies reserve at least one seat for women, and approximately 20 percent reserve more than one.

Table 1: Number of Seats For Constituencies in Local Elections (2002-2022)

# of Seats	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
# of Reserved Seats	0			1				2				3		
(Proportion)	(0.47)			(0.32)				(0.17)				(0.03)		
Count	333	129	125	125	111	87	79	71	62	51	28	17	15	1

3.2 Political Dynasties in Taiwan

With the new quota law for local elections, more women are expected to enter politics. However, it is also noteworthy that dynastic politicians, who play a significant role in local politics, have also seen growth during the same period. In my data, the share of dynastic councilors has grown from about 10% to 35% over the past two decades (see Figure 1).³

³ Prior to the nationwide unification of local election timing in 2014, election dates differed between municipalities and non-municipal jurisdictions. Given the limited time gap between these elections and the small number of municipalities before unification, election years are consolidated for analytical convenience. Specifically, elections held in 2005 and 2006 are coded as 2006, and elections held in 2009 and 2010 are coded as 2010.




Figure 1: Proportion of Dynastic Politicians in Local Councils (2002 - 2022)

The prominence of political dynasties in local councils may be related to the electoral system. As mentioned earlier, the SNTV-MMD system implies that there are multiple seats in a constituency. In most districts, parties often nominate more than one candidate. Given that the election outcome is determined by individual votes, it implies that candidates need to compete with candidates from other parties and within the same party.

According to [Shugart \(2001\)](#), this electoral system has several features. Intra-party battles are more prominent than inter-party competition. It is particularly challenging for candidates to receive support from the party when resources are limited, and the party has multiple candidates in the constituency. Second, issues and ideologies play a minimal role in the election because voters find it challenging to identify candidates' positions solely based on the party label. In addition, candidates have a strong incentive to build personal connections with voters through constituency service and pork barrel projects. In short, SNTV-MMD is a highly candidate-centered system, and this type of system is usually correlated with particularistic strategies ([Farrell et al., 1996](#); [Norris, 2004](#); [Muraoka, 2018](#)). Hence, candidates who have name recognition, such as dynastic

politicians, can have a huge advantage. Parties are more inclined to recruit dynastic candidates because of their capacity to amass personal votes ([Smith, 2018](#)).

Table 2 presents the gender distribution of dynastic and non-dynastic politicians in local council elections. First, pooling the 2002 to 2022 elections, slightly more women than men ran as candidates from political families. The distribution is entirely different for non-dynastic candidates. There are many more men than women among non-dynastic candidates. This indicates that men are generally more active in politics, but women with family ties have slightly higher chances of entering politics than their male counterparts. Secondly, there are still more men than women among elected representatives due to the significant disparity between the number of men and women candidates. However, women have a slightly higher chance of winning. For non-dynastic candidates, the probability is 48% for men and 51% for women. Win rates are far higher among dynastic candidates, with 70% of dynastic men and 72% of dynastic women securing seats, indicating that dynastic background carries a substantial electoral advantage. Last but not least, a higher proportion of women politicians (39%) than male (15%) politicians come from dynasties. Similar results can be found in other countries ([Dal Bó et al., 2009](#); [Basu, 2016](#); [Smith and Martin, 2017](#); [Nishizaki, 2018](#)).

Table 2: Gender Representation of Candidates and Councilors (2002-2022)

	Men	Women
Dynastic Candidates	820	886
(Councilors)	(571)	(642)
Non-Dynastic Candidates	6777	1969
(Councilors)	(3232)	(1012)

4 Empirical Design and Data

The identification strategy exploits a discontinuity generated by Taiwan’s gender quota rule for local council elections. Under the current electoral law, only constituencies electing four or more councilors are subject to gender quotas, which require the reservation of at least one seat for a woman. The number of council seats allocated to each constituency is determined by the following statutory formula:

$$\# \text{ of Total Seats in the local council} \times \frac{\text{Constituency Population}}{\text{Municipality Population}}$$

The resulting value is then rounded according to a mechanical rule. A constituency with a calculated seat value exceeding 3.5 is assigned four seats, which triggers the reservation of one seat for a woman. Similarly, constituencies with values exceeding 7.5 are assigned eight seats, with two woman-reserved seats, and so on. As a result, treatment status changes discontinuously at known cut points of the forcing variable.

This institutional feature gives rise to a regression discontinuity design (RDD). I compare constituencies located just below and just above the first relevant cutoff, where the predicted number of seats crosses 3.5. The unit of analysis is the constituency. The running (forcing) variable is the predicted number of seats implied by the statutory formula, and the treatment is the application of the gender quota, defined as the presence of at least one woman-reserved seat. Because nearly all constituencies with more than four seats are automatically subject to the quota, treatment assignment at the cutoff is effectively deterministic.⁴

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 Treat_{it} + \beta_2 Pred_{it} + \beta_3 Treat_{it} \times Pred_{it} + X'_{it}\gamma + \delta_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

⁴ Approximately 1% of constituencies (14 observations) do not comply with the assignment rule due to idiosyncratic rounding adjustments. These cases are excluded from the analysis.

$Treat_{it}$ is the dummy variable indicating whether the constituency applies quotas, $Pred_{it}$ is the distance from the formula cutoff, and X_{it} is a set of covariates comprising voter turnout and the number of parties in the constituency. The terms δ_i and λ_t denote constituency and year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using a triangular kernel and only those within the bandwidth enter the estimation (Calonico et al., 2014). The bandwidth is the MSE-optimal one selected separately for each outcome following Calonico et al. (2014), using a local linear polynomial and a quadratic bias-correction term. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level throughout.

I retrieved the election data of candidates from the Central Election Commission website and information about dynastic politicians from Batto (2018)’s article. He collected data from three major newspapers (United Daily News, China Times, and Liberty Times) in Taiwan by utilizing the local sections of the newspapers for each municipality.⁵ Because his dataset only covers elections from 2002 to 2014, I have employed the same approach to update the data to 2022. A candidate is coded as dynastic if a relative had been elected to public office at any level of government prior to the candidate’s own run.⁶

5 Results

Figures 2 and 3 visualize the impact of gender quotas on several outcomes: (1) the gender ratio of all candidates, (2) the gender ratio of elected candidates, (3) the ratio of dynastic to non-dynastic candidates, and (4) the ratio of dynastic to non-dynastic elected candidates. Table 3 presents the estimated effects of gender quotas on various descriptive representation outcomes. In constituencies with gender quotas, the gender ratio of can-

⁵ This method may be the most effective way to gather information on family ties, but it is still likely to under report the overall percentage of family ties.

⁶ Positions include village heads, township, county, and city councilors, executives at each level of local government, and the president.

didates increases by 12.8 percentage points, representing a 67% increase relative to the control group mean of 0.19. Similarly, the proportion of dynastic candidates increases by 11.6 percentage points, a 58% rise from the baseline of 0.20. This increase reflects a change in the composition of candidates rather than a mechanical implication of the quota rule, suggesting that quotas reshape party nomination strategies.

Beyond candidacy, the results also reveal positive and statistically significant effects on electoral success. These effects closely track the changes observed at the candidacy stage, indicating that quotas influence both who runs and who wins, rather than operating solely through reserved seats. Further analysis indicates that the proportion of dynastic women candidates and elected candidates also increases in constituencies with gender quotas. The share of dynastic candidates who are women is significantly higher in treated constituencies, both among those who run for seats and those who are elected. This pattern is not mechanically implied by gender quotas and points to a strategic reliance on women candidates from political families when parties face binding nomination constraints. That the shift is already visible among candidates also speaks to where in the electoral process it originates. An account in which voters alone reshape the composition of women in office would predict a change among those elected without a corresponding change among those nominated, which is not what the data show. These findings suggest that gender quotas not only encourage greater participation from women and dynastic candidates but also improve their likelihood of electoral success.⁷

Although the reserved-seat rule guarantees women a minimum number of seats, in practice it rarely determines who wins. Across all elections from 2002 to 2022, only 94 of the 1,692 women elected (5.6 percent) owed their seat to the reserved-seat mechanism, in the sense that their raw vote total placed them below the district’s seat threshold and a

⁷ Table A1 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the original dataset.

lower-ranked man was displaced in their favor. The remaining 94.4 percent won on their own vote totals, competing directly with men for ordinary seats. The share of women who depend on the reserved seat has also fallen steadily over time, from 14.7 percent in 2002 to 1.2 percent in 2022 (Table A2). This pattern indicates that the large increases in women’s descriptive representation documented above are not a mechanical consequence of the guarantee. They instead reflect a change in the pool of candidates that parties nominate and run, consistent with the supply-side account developed here.

Notably, this finding stands in contrast to evidence from Japan. [Smith \(2018\)](#) shows that, at the national level, institutions that facilitate dynastic representation are associated with weaker women’s representation. The case of Taiwan’s local elections, however, suggests that a candidate-centered system does not necessarily hinder women’s representation. With the implementation of gender quotas, it is possible to accommodate the interests of both dynasties and parties while simultaneously enhancing women’s representation. The major difference between Japan and Taiwan is the existence of gender quotas, which motivate dynasties and parties to nominate dynastic women.




Figure 2: Effect of Gender Quotas on Women Candidates and Councilors




Figure 3: Effect of Quotas on Dynastic Candidates and Councilors

Table 3: RD Effects of Gender Quotas on Descriptive Representation

	Women / All Candidates	Elected Women / All Elected	Dyn / All Candidates	Elected Dyn / All Elected
RD Effect	0.128*	0.236***	0.116**	0.149**
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.044)	(0.059)
Control Mean	0.19	0.17	0.20	0.23
Observations	146	146	168	169
Bandwidth	0.60	0.60	0.71	0.72
	Dyn Women / All Candidates	Elected Dyn Women / All Elected	Dyn Women / All Dyn	Elected Dyn Women / All Elected Dyn
RD Effect	0.088***	0.119***	0.388***	0.347***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.112)	(0.128)
Control Mean	0.08	0.08	0.26	0.15
Observations	200	234	263	308
Bandwidth	0.83	0.97	1.14	1.34
Bandwidth rule	optimal	optimal	optimal	optimal
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Polynomial	linear	linear	linear	linear

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Dyn refers to dynastic candidates, Elected Dyn refers to elected dynastic candidates, Dyn Women refers to dynastic women candidates, and Elected Dyn Women refers to elected dynastic women candidates. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout and the number of parties. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.

To confirm the robustness of the main findings, I conducted a series of tests. First, I test for manipulation of the running variable using the local polynomial density estimator proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2020). The results, presented in Figure A1, show no evidence of sorting around the cutoff ($T = 0.47$, $p = 0.638$). I also check the covariate balance

at the RD Threshold (Table A3). Secondly, a placebo test was conducted to verify the results in Table 3 by using an alternative cutoff. In accordance with the gender quota rule, constituencies with five and six seats are allocated the same number of reserved seats (one seat). Thus, the objective was to ascertain whether there is a notable ratio increase for dynastic women candidates in six-seat constituencies relative to five-seat constituencies. Table A4 in the appendix indicates that the available evidence does not substantiate the assertion that the increased availability of seats is a primary driver of the observed rise in dynastic women candidates. Consequently, it can be inferred that the reserved seats for women, rather than the additional available seats, are a key factor in the increase in women candidates and dynastic women candidates. A parallel placebo at a lower cutoff of 1.5, a one-to-two-seat increment that likewise activates no quota, yields the same null result (see Table A5), further indicating that the additional seat alone does not drive the observed effects. Third, I also show that the results remain consistent with different bandwidths (see Table A7 and A8 in the Appendix).

As an additional robustness check, I separate the effect of the reserved seat from that of the additional council seat, which change together at the quota threshold. I exploit the fact that district magnitude rises by one seat at every half-integer of the forcing variable, whereas a reserved seat is activated only at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5. Pooling all seat thresholds within a common local window and recentering the forcing variable at each, I estimate a single marginal-seat effect together with an additional effect at the quota thresholds. As Table A6 shows, the marginal-seat effect is essentially zero for every outcome, with all estimates below 0.05 in absolute value. The incremental quota effect, by contrast, is positive throughout and substantially larger, reaching 0.115 for the share of women candidates, 0.148 for elected women, and above 0.25 for dynastic women within the

dynastic pool. The additional council seat therefore does nothing on its own, indicating that the reserved seat, not the extra seat, drives the results.

As discussed earlier, I argue that Taiwan’s gender quota rules incentivize parties to nominate women, as this represents the most strategic response under the institutional constraints. If one party fails to nominate a woman, it effectively cedes the reserved seat to its opponent. However, not just any woman candidate can secure the seat. She must be electorally competitive. In the Taiwanese context, such competitiveness is often associated with dynastic background (Batto, 2018). Therefore, we should expect to observe higher rates of women’s and dynastic nominations, particularly dynastic women, in constituencies subject to gender quotas.

A key assumption underlying this argument is that dynastic candidates are, on average, more electorally competitive. Using candidate-level vote share as the outcome, Figure 4 shows that dynastic candidates consistently receive higher vote shares across pooled, women-only, and male-only specifications. Crucially, this pattern holds in multi-member districts, where electoral victory and vote share are not mechanically linked. These results indicate that dynastic background is associated with greater electoral prospects, providing parties with a strategic incentive to rely on dynastic women when responding to gender quota constraints.⁸

⁸ The OLS specifications underlying Figure 4 control for candidate age, incumbency, and major party nomination (KMT and DPP). Even with these controls, dynastic background is associated with a positive and statistically significant effect on vote share. Complete regression results are reported in the Appendix Table A9. Educational background is not included in the main specifications because education data are missing for earlier election cycles, and including this control would substantially reduce the sample size. Nevertheless, Appendix Table A9 shows that the estimated dynastic effect remains positive and statistically significant when education is included as a control.




Figure 4: Dynastic Background and Candidate Vote Share

To test this claim, I examine the nomination strategies of the two major parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The results, presented in Figure 5, support this argument. In districts with gender quotas, both parties nominate a higher share of women among all party nominees, a higher share of dynastic candidates among all party nominees, and a higher share of dynastic women among women nominees. Notably, these patterns are more pronounced for the DPP. While the KMT also shows positive coefficients for the share of women and the share of dynastic candidates among its nominees, these effects are not statistically significant. By contrast, when focusing on the nomination of dynastic women among women candidates, the effect is positive for both parties and statistically significant for the KMT, indicating a greater reliance on dynastic women when nominating women candidates in quota districts. Because these outcomes are measured over party nominees rather than winners, they locate the compositional shift at the stage where parties, not voters, are making the choice.⁹

⁹ See Table A10 in the appendix for the complete table.




Figure 5: RD Effects of the Gender Quota on Parties' Nomination Strategy

Figure 6 further illustrates the gap in vote share between women candidates from two major parties and other minor parties in constituencies with quotas. The coefficients for the aggregate major parties and one of the major parties (DPP) are positive and significant. Though the coefficient for the other major party (KMT) is insignificant, it is still positive. The vote share gap between the two major parties and minor parties is aligned with their behaviors during the legislation of the gender quota. In comparison to the KMT, the DPP has experienced a more pronounced advantage following the implementation of a gender quota. This pattern is consistent with the DPP's earlier and stronger commitment to quota adoption, which may have allowed it to better internalize and strategically adapt to the new nomination rules.

Generally speaking, it is more difficult for small parties to find competitive women candidates, so they either do not nominate or recruit candidates with low name recognition. As a result, quotas impose asymmetric constraints across parties, disproportionately binding smaller parties with thinner candidate pools. This results in a situation where

the stronger parties become even stronger, while the weaker ones become even weaker.¹⁰




Figure 6: RD Effects of the Gender Quota on Parties' Vote Share

While the previous analyses show that the gender quota creates incentives for major parties to nominate women, particularly competitive dynastic women, these benefits depend critically on the availability of suitable candidates. Strategic responses operate within real-world supply constraints. Not all districts provide parties with an adequate pool of electorally competitive women, and this constraint becomes more severe as the number of reserved seats increases. Table 4 illustrates this point. Both the KMT and the DPP exhibit substantially higher rates of “gender deficit” districts when more seats are reserved for women. These deficits reflect situations in which parties cannot find enough competitive women candidates to fully meet the quota requirement.

In this sense, the quota system creates both strategic advantages and practical challenges. When strong women candidates are available, parties gain from nominating them. When they are not available, parties face quota obligations that are difficult to satisfy. This duality helps explain why media reports occasionally note that major parties forgo

¹⁰ See Table A11 in the appendix for the complete table.

contesting certain women-reserved seats because they lack “suitable” candidates (Young, 1998). It also suggests that, in practice, candidate quality often outweighs strict numerical compliance. Parties tend to nominate fewer but more competitive women to protect their electoral position, especially in districts with a larger number of reserved seats.

Table 4: Gender Deficit Districts of Major Parties

	1 reserved seat	2 reserved seats	3 reserved seats
KMT	18.4%	40.6%	54.5%
DPP	35.0%	74.0%	91.0%

Notes: % means the percentage of gender deficit districts among all districts in the category. A deficit district indicates that the party nominates fewer women candidates than the number of women-reserved seats that the constituency has.

6 Substantive Representation of Women

Given that the gender quota leads to an increase in certain types of politicians, what are the potential policy implications? As demonstrated in previous sections, the implementation of gender quotas led to an increase not only in women’s representation but also in the presence of dynastic politicians. Most of the existing literature suggests that dynasties are generally viewed as less attentive to women’s interests, even when the dynastic politicians themselves are women (Jalalzai, 2008; Choi, 2019; Thompson, 2022; Ascencio and Malik, 2024). Schwindt-Bayer (2010) also points out that elite women have different life experiences from those of ordinary women. This divergence may shape distinct policy preferences and limit the extent to which they represent broader women’s interests.

To assess whether gender quotas still result in policy changes beyond shifts in descriptive representation, I examine the legislative behavior of councilors in local councils. To be more specific, I look at the frequency and context of sponsored bills and speeches that

covered women-related issues from 2002 to 2023.¹¹

The next question is how to construct the keywords for women-related issues. To build a comprehensive list of women's issues, I draw on several previous studies ([Meguid et al., 2025](#); [Burrell, 1996](#); [Gerrity et al., 2007](#); [Lawless, 2015](#); [Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014](#)). Generally, issues such as gender equity, child care, employee flex time, and abortion are typically included. The most appropriate approach is to rely on prior studies conducted in the same country. However, because most official surveys in Taiwan provide only broad categories of women's issues without specifying particular keywords, I ultimately draw on the keywords they employ, while making minor modifications to suit the Taiwanese context.¹²

I utilize the official database of local council minutes as the primary source of information.¹³ For cities and counties not included in the database, I supplement with keyword searches on the respective local council websites. And then, I filter the council minutes by searching for relevant Chinese keywords. These keywords are selected to capture speeches or bills related to the topics of interest. My coding of women-related issues follows the operationalization used in the Taiwanese legislative context by [Shim \(2021\)](#), who adopts an eclectic definition that combines a narrow core of gender-equality issues directly targeting women (for example, sexual harassment, domestic violence, and equal employment) with broader issues that disproportionately burden women in Taiwan, notably childcare, elder care, and work and family balance. As [Shim \(2021\)](#) argues, these

¹¹ In the context of local councils in Taiwan, the main difference between bills and speeches lies in the requirement that the former must be seconded by multiple councilors, whereas the latter does not. It is common to see councilors mention the same issues in both their proposals and speeches, and the local governments need to respond if there are some requests or questions in bills or speeches. Moreover, the number of required seconders for a bill is usually low (1–2 councilors). Therefore, in this paper, I treat both as forms of legislative behavior in a broad sense.

¹² For the complete list of keywords and the corresponding descriptive statistics, see Tables [A12](#) and [A13](#) in the appendix.

¹³ <https://journal.th.gov.tw/>

care-related domains belong to women’s issues precisely because the gendered division of labor makes women disproportionately responsible for them, which justifies treating childcare- and care-related keywords as part of women’s substantive representation rather than as generic family policy. I then manually review the context of the filtered paragraphs. Table 5 provides two examples. If a bill is co-sponsored by multiple councilors, every co-sponsor is counted separately. Therefore, for this type of bill, the unit of analysis is the individual councilor. ¹⁴

Table 5: Examples of Bills and Speeches

Councilors	Content	Type	Keyword1	Keyword2	Year	County/City
Tai Ning	For the safety of the learning environment for young children, it is recommended that the Chiayi City Government actively address the "Seismic Reinforcement Project of Chiayi City Wu Feng Kindergarten."	Bills	children	kindergarten	2018	Chiayi City
Huang Tian-Tsai	...Looking back over the past six or seven years, especially in the last two or three years, unemployment among workers in the southern region has increased even more. Disadvantaged groups have also been growing in number, including a worsening situation among single-parent families due to divorce.	Speeches	single parent	divorce	2007	Kaohsiung City

Furthermore, Figure 7 visualizes the most popular keywords included in bills and speeches, and the three most popular keywords are kindergarten, children, and women. ¹⁵ It is understandable that child-related issues, such as asking for new kindergartens, have become popular. On one hand, this is a concern shared by fathers and mothers, not just a women-specific issue. On the other hand, advocating for new public facilities is one of the easiest achievements for local councilors to claim credit for. Compared to discussing

¹⁴ Figure A2 shows the frequency trend of women-related bills and speeches. We can see the related bills and speeches increase over time.

¹⁵ Since this study focuses on local councils, laws or regulations about parental leave or women’s employment protection fall outside the jurisdiction of local governments. As a result, local councilors are less likely to address these issues.

abstract law or policy changes, new public infrastructure is more visible and tangible to voters. This finding also aligns with previous research, suggesting that gender quotas are more likely to influence policies that transcend party lines or ideological divisions. These issues tend to face less resistance from conservative groups, who are generally more hesitant to adopt progressive policies. (Barnes, 2016; Weeks, 2022; Wiliarty, 2010).



Figure 7: Text Cloud of Keywords Included in Bills and Speeches

I apply the same regression-discontinuity design to legislative output, modeling the count of women-related bills and speeches (Table 6). Because the outcome is a non-negative count that is right-skewed with many zeros, I estimate it by Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML), which is consistent as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified and, with cluster-robust standard errors, does not require the equidispersion assumption of the Poisson model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). PPML also lets the number of councilors elected in the constituency enter as an offset so that the estimate can be expressed as an effect on output per councilor. Districts subject to the quota produce substantially more women-related legislation in the aggregate, with an incidence-rate ratio of 4.18 ($p < 0.01$). Adding the log of the number of elected councilors

as an offset, the second column shows that the per-councilor rate also rises sharply, with an incidence-rate ratio of 3.25 ($p < 0.01$). The two estimates line up as expected, since the aggregate increase is approximately the product of the per-councilor rate and the mechanical growth in district magnitude at the cutoff. Aggregate output reflects the number of seats, the composition of the elected group, and how much each councilor does. The offset removes the first of these, so the per-councilor column should be read as the effect net of the mechanical seat change rather than as a separate causal total effect. Isolating the last component requires councilor-level estimates that hold gender fixed, which I turn to below.

Table 6: Substantive Representation (PPML RD)

	Aggregate Count (no offset)	Per-Councilor Rate (offset = log elected councilors)
RD Effect (log)	1.430*** (0.440)	1.179*** (0.445)
Incidence-rate ratio	4.18	3.25
Control mean	1.86	0.67
Observations	270	270
Bandwidth	1.42	1.42
Model	PPML	PPML
Covariates	Y	Y

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) regression-discontinuity estimates (Santos Silva and Tenreiro, 2006). Coefficients are on the log scale and the incidence-rate ratio is $\exp(\hat{\beta})$. With cluster-robust standard errors, PPML is consistent whenever the conditional mean is correctly specified and does not require the count to be equidispersed (variance equal to the mean), so overdispersion does not threaten the estimates. Column 2 includes $\log(\text{elected councilors})$ as an offset, so the estimate is the effect on women’s-issue output per councilor. PPML with fixed effects drops constituency or year groups with no women-related output, which slightly reduces the effective sample. Standard errors clustered at the constituency level; constituency and year fixed effects; triangular kernel weights.

Having established that quotas increase women-related bills and speeches, I next ex-

amine which types of councilors drive this pattern. This disaggregated analysis compares how different types of councilors, distinguished by gender and dynastic status, contribute to women-related legislation and clarifies whether quotas merely increase descriptive representation or whether specific subgroups translate them into substantive policy engagement.

Figure 8 indicates that both dynastic and non-dynastic women introduce more bills and speeches than their male counterparts, whereas the difference between dynastic and non-dynastic women is relatively modest. Notably, dynastic men are more active than non-dynastic men, a pattern that will be examined in the subsequent analysis of spillover effects. This descriptive pattern suggests that gender, rather than dynastic status, may be the primary determinant of legislative attention to women’s issues, a claim examined more rigorously in the regression analysis below.




Figure 8: Women-Related Bills and Speeches by Gender and Dynastic Status

As documented in other democracies, a potential concern is whether dynastic women elected under gender quotas merely serve as proxies for their male family members, which would undermine substantive representation. Figure 8 suggests it is not the case. The relatively small gap between dynastic and non-dynastic women implies that dynastic back-

ground does not suppress women-relevant legislative activity. One plausible interpretation is that electoral incentives operate similarly regardless of dynastic background. Under Taiwan's SNTV system, all women councilors face competitive pressure to cultivate personal vote shares, and engaging with women-related issues offers a credible and accessible strategy for doing so, given voter expectations attached to women representatives. Dynastic background may ease entry into office, but it does not insulate incumbents from the accountability pressures that shape legislative behavior once in office. While the present analysis cannot directly establish this mechanism, the absence of any dynastic attenuation is consistent with this interpretation and runs counter to the placeholder hypothesis.

The rarity with which the reserved seat actually binds also bears on the substantive-representation results. Because the overwhelming majority of women councilors reach office by clearing the vote threshold rather than through the guaranteed seat, they hold office under genuine electoral competition and face the same re-election incentives as other councilors. Their engagement with women's issues is therefore better understood as a response to ordinary electoral accountability than as an artifact of the quota mechanism. Whether dynastic women in particular act mainly as extensions of their families is a distinct question, which the absence of any dynastic attenuation in legislative activity addresses directly. The declining reliance on the reserved seat over time reinforces the supply-side interpretation. The quota operates *ex ante*, by changing the incentives parties face when selecting nominees, rather than *ex post*, through the mechanical award of seats. Parties increasingly preempt the constraint by nominating competitive women, which is precisely why the guarantee itself binds so rarely. In this sense the quota is effective not because it directly seats women, but because it reshapes the nomination behavior that produces them.

Consistent with these descriptive patterns, the regression results in Table 7 show that gender quotas are associated with a substantial increase in women-related bills and speeches.¹⁶ Contrary to Hypothesis 4, I find no evidence that dynastic women are less engaged with women’s issues. Among women councilors, the coefficient on dynastic background is close to zero and statistically insignificant (0.010), and the interaction between being a woman and having a dynastic background is likewise insignificant (-0.103, $p > 0.1$), indicating that women’s legislative engagement on gender issues is not conditional on family ties. Although the interaction between gender and quota exposure is also insignificant, the positive association between women councilors and women-related policy activity remains robust across specifications.

Although the women coefficient becomes insignificant in the interaction specification, this reflects multicollinearity with the interaction terms rather than an absence of gender effect, as the Women Only column confirms that quota exposure remains positive and significant among women councilors alone. This suggests that quotas raise substantive representation both by placing more women in office and by raising how much individual councilors engage, since the per-councilor rate rises alongside the aggregate. Existing work has largely attributed substantive gains to the presence of more women (Clayton et al., 2017). Here the aggregate increase survives the removal of the mechanical seat effect, and the councilor-level estimates show that engagement also rises within gender, so presence is not the whole story. Although earlier evidence shows that more dynastic politicians have entered local councils over time, the regression results provide no evidence that this compositional change undermines substantive representation on women-related

¹⁶ Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Table A14. Because information on councilors’ educational background is incomplete, including education as a control variable results in a substantial reduction in sample size. For completeness, Appendix Table A15 reports specifications that additionally control for education. The main results remain robust.

issues.

By contrast, among male councilors, quota exposure is associated with a significant increase in engagement with women-related issues (coefficient = 0.494, $p < 0.01$), indicating a spillover effect whereby quotas reshape male legislative priorities. This effect is however heterogeneous across dynastic status. The interaction between dynastic background and quota exposure among men is negative and statistically significant (coefficient = -0.783 , $p < 0.05$), implying that the spillover effect is significantly attenuated among dynastic men. One plausible interpretation is that dynastic men in non-quota districts engage with women-related issues primarily through constituency service logic rather than genuine policy commitment. Where women's representation is lower, they may fill the representational gap as part of their broader electoral strategy. Once quotas bring more women into office, this role is displaced by women councilors themselves, leaving dynastic men with less incentive to engage. In summary, while gender quotas directly empower women councilors, they also indirectly reshape male legislative behavior, though the extent of this reshaping depends on dynastic background.

For non-dynastic male councilors, the spillover pattern is consistent with the interpretation that gender quotas operate through changes in issue salience and peer dynamics within legislative bodies. By altering the gender composition of legislatures, gender quotas increase the prominence of women-related issues and are associated with shifts in the content and tone of legislative discussion ([Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014](#)). In such settings, women's increased descriptive representation may enhance the visibility and perceived legitimacy of women-related concerns, making them more salient topics of legislative activity. As a result, non-dynastic men may face greater normative or strategic incentives to engage with women-related policy debates ([Bratton, 2005](#)). While the present analysis

does not directly observe deliberative interactions or test these mechanisms, the observed spillover patterns are consistent with institutional accounts emphasizing how changes in gender composition reshape agenda-setting dynamics and peer influence within collective decision-making bodies.

Table 7: Councilor Responses to Gender Quotas

Dependent Variable: Number of Bills and Speeches				
	Baseline	Interaction	Men Only	Women Only
Dynastic (0/1)	−0.160*	0.572*	0.531	0.010
	(0.082)	(0.303)	(0.368)	(0.371)
Quota (0/1)	0.520***	0.564***	0.494***	1.039***
	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.342)
Women (0/1)	0.506***	0.106		
	(0.083)	(0.310)		
Dynastic × Quota		−0.762**	−0.783**	−0.217
		(0.301)	(0.367)	(0.414)
Women × Dynastic		−0.103		
		(0.169)		
Women × Quota		0.473		
		(0.309)		
Constituency FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,640	5,640	3,948	1,692
R^2	0.300	0.302	0.304	0.441

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The dependent variable is the count of women-related bills and speeches. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects.

A remaining concern is whether dynastic women shift policy priorities relative to their own predecessors, or merely replicate the family brand. To address this, I conduct within-family comparisons. While prior research suggests that kin successors often maintain the

family brand to preserve incumbency advantages and representational continuity (Smith, 2018), the observed patterns suggest a more heterogeneous reality. Figure 9 shows among women successors, 40 percent are more active than their dynasty seniors, 42 percent show similar levels of activity, and only 18 percent are less active. These findings challenge the strong version of the “placeholder” hypothesis, which assumes that women successors passively continue the political agenda of their predecessors. It is important to note that this analysis is limited to cases in which the senior relative also served as a city councilor. Women councilors whose predecessors held other positions, such as township heads or members of parliament, are not included in this comparison.




Figure 9: Engaging Women’s Issues: Dynastic Women vs. Their Predecessors

While institutional and familial constraints may shape women’s legislative behavior, the evidence provides limited support for the view that dynastic women are merely passive transmitters of their family seniors’ approaches. Regression results suggest that inheriting a seat from a male senior is not significantly associated with greater engagement on women-related issues. Moreover, within-family comparisons reveal substantial variation

in behavior, and many dynastic women appear to pursue their own legislative priorities, with a considerable share more active than their predecessors.

7 Conclusion

This paper has developed a supply-side account of quota effects, in which what a quota delivers depends on the pool of electorally competitive women that parties can draw on. Where that pool is thin, a quota does not simply add women to office, it channels the benefit toward women who already hold the electoral assets that winning requires. Taiwan provides a setting where this constraint binds sharply, but the logic applies wherever personal votes matter and competitive non-dynastic women are in short supply. Quotas substantially enhanced the descriptive representation of women, but they also reshaped party nomination strategies in ways that increased the presence of dynastic politicians in local politics. In particular, dynastic women emerged as electorally competitive candidates under quota constraints, reflecting parties' strategic responses to gender-based nomination requirements. These dynamics also differ across parties, reinforcing the advantages of larger parties with deeper candidate pools while imposing greater constraints on smaller competitors.

The findings also indicate that the expansion of women's substantive representation associated with gender quotas operates primarily through the increased presence and activity of women legislators. Although a nontrivial share of these women enter office through political families, dynastic background does not systematically condition their engagement with women-related issues. Instead, the evidence points to substantial heterogeneity in how dynastic women approach legislative work, suggesting that dynastic entry does not entail a mechanical inheritance of policy priorities. In this sense, quota-induced changes

in political selection alter who enters office without constraining how women legislators define and pursue their substantive agendas. Put differently, expanding women’s descriptive representation through political dynasties involves no tradeoff with its substantive content.

Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this study, whether gender quotas represent a win for women or for political dynasties, the evidence suggests that it is a win for women that runs through dynasties. Dynastic families adapted to the constraint by fielding women from within, and this did not come at the expense of women’s substantive representation, which rose. The introduction of quotas has led to a measurable increase in the share of both women and dynastic councilors. Entering office on a family name does not make women less engaged with women’s issues than other women councilors, and dynastic women vary considerably in how they approach legislative work. Some adopt priorities distinct from their predecessors, while others align more closely.

Constituencies exposed to gender quotas exhibit higher volumes of bills and speeches addressing women’s concerns, and these efforts are disproportionately led by women councilors. While dynasties continue to play a prominent role in local politics, their influence does not translate into uniform patterns of representation. Rather than signaling a convergence of dynastic interests and gendered advocacy, these patterns point to a more complex negotiation between familial legacies and institutional demands. Notably, these effects are not confined to women councilors alone. Although gender quotas directly regulate the nomination and election of women, the analysis indicates that male councilors in quota-exposed constituencies also become more engaged with women-related issues. This pattern points to a spillover effect within councils, whereby quota-induced changes in the composition and visibility of women councilors reshape the incentives and issue priorities

of their male counterparts. The response is concentrated among non-dynastic men, while dynastic men engage little more than they would without the quota.

This paper also points to several directions for future research. One direction is to examine how the spillover effects identified here develop over time, and whether sustained exposure to gender quotas leads to more durable changes in male councilors' issue priorities. Another important question concerns dynastic succession, namely under what conditions women who enter office through political families can reshape their family's representational style rather than conform to existing patterns. Finally, future work could investigate how gender quota institutions interact with entrenched elite structures across different institutional and electoral contexts, offering deeper insight into the long-term representational consequences of gender-based reforms.

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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics of the Original Dataset

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics


	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
# of All Candidates	1,220	8.470	6.438	1.000	34.000
# of All Women Candidates	1,220	2.304	2.117	0.000	10.000
# of All Elected Candidates	1,220	4.430	3.249	1.000	14.000
# of All Elected Women Candidates	1,220	1.343	1.322	0.000	7.000
# of Dyn Candidates	1,220	1.385	1.574	0.000	10.000
# of Elected Dyn Candidates	1,220	0.987	1.252	0.000	8.000
# of Dyn Women Candidates	1,220	0.719	0.969	0.000	6.000
# of Elected Dyn Women Candidates	1,220	0.523	0.795	0.000	6.000
Constituency w/ Quota	1,220	0.525	0.500	0.000	1.000
Distance From the Cutoff	1,220	0.859	3.327	-3.347	10.121
Voter Turnout	1,220	0.660	0.084	0.363	0.925
# of Parties	1,220	3.250	1.540	1.000	12.000

Table A2: Elected Women Owing Their Seat to the Reserved-Seat Rule, by Election

Election	Elected Women	Quota-Dependent	Share (%)
2002	225	33	14.7
2005/06	271	28	10.3
2009/10	269	16	5.9
2014	278	9	3.2
2018	307	4	1.3
2022	342	4	1.2
Total	1,692	94	5.6

A woman is counted as *quota-dependent* if she is elected but her raw vote total ranks below the number of seats in her district, so that a lower-ranked man is displaced in her favor under the reserved-seat rule. All other elected women win on their own vote totals.

Robustness Checks



Manipulation test using the local polynomial density estimator of Cattaneo et al. (2020). The test yields a robust test statistic of $T = 0.47$ ($p = 0.638$), providing no evidence of sorting around the cutoff.

Figure A1: Density Manipulation Test

Table A3: Covariate Balance at the Quota Threshold

	Voter Turnout	Number of Parties
Coefficient	0.009	0.290
	(0.015)	(0.386)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Each covariate is used as the outcome variable in an RD regression at the quota threshold (predicted seat allocation = 3.5), following the same specification as Table 3. Absence of a significant discontinuity indicates that covariates are locally balanced around the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.

Table A4: Placebo Cutoff Test: RD Effects at Cutoff = 5.5

	Women / All Candidates	Elected Women / All Elected	Dyn / All Candidates	Elected Dyn / All Elected
RD Effect	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.109** (0.050)	-0.086* (0.050)	-0.175** (0.070)
Control Mean	0.33	0.37	0.23	0.29
Observations	216	200	330	325
Bandwidth	1.13	1.05	1.63	1.58
	Dyn Women / All Candidates	Elected Dyn Women / All Elected	Dyn Women / All Dyn	Elected Dyn Women / All Elected Dyn
RD Effect	-0.030 (0.041)	-0.066 (0.060)	-0.065 (0.223)	-0.141 (0.213)
Control Mean	0.13	0.17	0.52	0.49
Observations	263	242	303	247
Bandwidth	1.35	1.24	1.50	1.27
Bandwidth rule	optimal	optimal	optimal	optimal
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Polynomial	linear	linear	linear	linear

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Placebo cutoff set at predicted seat allocation = 5.5; main analysis uses predicted seat allocation = 3.5. A separate treatment indicator (yesquota_p55 = 1 if predicted seat allocation ≥ 5.5) and centred running variable (cutoff_p55 = predicted seat allocation - 5.5) are constructed for this test. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout and the number of parties. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.

Table A5: Placebo Cutoff Test: RD Effects at Cutoff = 1.5

	Women / All Candidates	Elected Women / All Elected	Dyn / All Candidates	Elected Dyn / All Elected
RD Effect	0.106 (0.092)	-0.077 (0.119)	0.040 (0.041)	0.058 (0.057)
Control Mean	0.16	0.20	0.12	0.19
Observations	209	238	231	199
Bandwidth	0.66	0.73	0.72	0.63
	Dyn Women / All Candidates	Elected Dyn Women / All Elected	Dyn Women / All Dyn	Elected Dyn Women / All Elected Dyn
RD Effect	0.027 (0.028)	0.056 (0.040)	0.032 (0.078)	0.059 (0.057)
Control Mean	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.08
Observations	230	196	230	194
Bandwidth	0.72	0.62	0.72	0.61
Bandwidth rule	optimal	optimal	optimal	optimal
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Polynomial	linear	linear	linear	linear

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Placebo cutoff set at predicted seat allocation = 1.5 (a seat increment with no quota); main analysis uses = 3.5. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout and the number of parties. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.

Table A6: Pooled Multi-cutoff RD: Marginal-Seat vs. Incremental Quota Effect

Outcome	Marginal-Seat Effect (D)	Incremental Quota Effect ($D \times \text{QuotaCut}$)	Obs.
Women / All Candidates	-0.009 (0.023)	0.115*** (0.024)	976
Elected Women / All Elected	-0.013 (0.031)	0.148*** (0.036)	976
Dyn / All Candidates	-0.010 (0.018)	0.019 (0.026)	976
Elected Dyn / All Elected	0.001 (0.025)	0.032 (0.035)	976
Dyn Women / All Candidates	-0.002 (0.014)	0.041** (0.020)	976
Elected Dyn Women / All Elected	0.004 (0.022)	0.077** (0.034)	976
Dyn Women / All Dyn	-0.048 (0.059)	0.254*** (0.091)	976
Elected Dyn Women / All Elected Dyn	-0.045 (0.063)	0.256** (0.099)	976

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors in parentheses. All half-integer thresholds of the forcing variable are pooled; the running variable is recentered at each and capped at a bandwidth of 0.5. D is the common marginal-seat effect; $D \times \text{QuotaCut}$ is the additional effect at quota thresholds (the quota effect net of the extra seat). Specification includes cutoff and year fixed effects; SEs clustered at the constituency level; triangular kernel weights.

Table A7: RD Effects for Main Results with Varying Bandwidths

Women / All Candidates			
RD Effect	0.128*	0.146***	0.131**
	(0.072)	(0.050)	(0.058)
Observations	146	276	433
Bandwidth	0.60	1.20	1.79
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual
Elected Women / All Elected			
RD Effect	0.236***	0.258***	0.227***
	(0.074)	(0.062)	(0.045)
Observations	146	276	429
Bandwidth	0.60	1.19	1.79
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual
Dyn / All Candidates			
RD Effect	0.116**	0.084**	0.078**
	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Observations	168	327	516
Bandwidth	0.71	1.42	2.13
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual
Elected Dyn / All Elected			
RD Effect	0.149**	0.107*	0.096
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.064)
Observations	169	329	522
Bandwidth	0.72	1.44	2.15
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout and the number of parties. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.

Table A8: RD Effects for Main Results with Varying Bandwidths

Dyn Women / All Candidates			
RD Effect	0.088*** (0.032)	0.065* (0.033)	0.056** (0.027)
Observations	200	390	610
Bandwidth	0.83	1.66	2.49
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual
Elected Dyn Women / All Elected			
RD Effect	0.119*** (0.034)	0.092* (0.050)	0.082 (0.060)
Observations	234	474	769
Bandwidth	0.97	1.94	2.91
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual
Dyn Women / All Dyn			
RD Effect	0.388*** (0.112)	0.342*** (0.128)	0.294*** (0.094)
Observations	263	555	935
Bandwidth	1.14	2.29	3.43
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual
Elected Dyn Women / All Elected Dyn			
RD Effect	0.347*** (0.128)	0.321** (0.128)	0.273* (0.150)
Observations	308	667	977
Bandwidth	1.34	2.68	4.02
Bandwidth rule	optimal	manual	manual

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout and the number of parties. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.

Supplementary Results

Table A9: Dynastic Background and Candidate Vote Share

	Pooled (1)	Pooled (2)	Women (1)	Women (2)	Men (1)	Men (2)
Dynastic (0/1)	0.0155*** (0.0033)	0.0159*** (0.0041)	0.0170*** (0.0039)	0.0166*** (0.0054)	0.0165*** (0.0031)	0.0166*** (0.0040)
Women (0/1)	-0.0065*** (0.0020)	-0.0040 (0.0028)				
Age (years)	-0.0002* (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0004 (0.0002)	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0002)
Major Party (0/1)	0.0341*** (0.0020)	0.0400*** (0.0030)	0.0317*** (0.0036)	0.0381*** (0.0054)	0.0343*** (0.0022)	0.0396*** (0.0032)
Incumbent (0/1)	0.0481*** (0.0026)	0.0516*** (0.0039)	0.0334*** (0.0047)	0.0352*** (0.0066)	0.0506*** (0.0026)	0.0549*** (0.0039)
Dynastic $\times$ Women	0.0000 (0.0050)	-0.0019 (0.0065)				
Education		-0.0002 (0.0006)		-0.0002 (0.0009)		0.0001 (0.0006)
Constituency FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,758	6,464	2,919	1,932	7,839	4,532
R ²	0.638	0.580	0.642	0.582	0.671	0.620

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The dependent variable is candidate vote share. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. *Dynastic* indicates whether a candidate has a dynastic political background. *Women* is a binary indicator equal to one for women candidates. *Age* is measured in years. *Major Party* indicates affiliation with a major political party. *Incumbent* equals one if the candidate is an incumbent. *Education* is measured as years of schooling.

Table A10: RD Effects of the Gender Quota on Parties' Nomination Strategy

	KMT Women/ KMT	DPP Women/ DPP	KMT E Women/ KMT Elected	DPP E Women/ DPP Elected
RD Effect	0.113 (0.092)	0.283*** (0.083)	0.090 (0.104)	0.386** (0.171)
Control Mean	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.07
Observations	164	232	184	223
Bandwidth	0.68	0.97	0.78	0.91
	KMT Dyn/ KMT	DPP Dyn/ DPP	KMT E Dyn/ KMT Elected	DPP E Dyn/ DPP Elected
RD Effect	0.221** (0.097)	0.209** (0.083)	0.183* (0.093)	0.147** (0.066)
Control Mean	0.24	0.14	0.22	0.11
Observations	170	276	221	355
Bandwidth	0.73	1.21	0.90	1.57
	KMT Dyn Women/ KMT Women	DPP Dyn Women/ DPP Women	KMT E Dyn Women/ KMT E Women	DPP E Dyn Women/ DPP E Women
RD Effect	0.315** (0.126)	0.222* (0.119)	0.354*** (0.121)	0.164* (0.085)
Control Mean	0.10	0.10	0.06	0.07
Observations	255	364	304	308
Bandwidth	1.11	1.59	1.33	1.35
Bandwidth rule	optimal	optimal	optimal	optimal
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Polynomial	linear	linear	linear	linear

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout and the number of parties. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.

Table A11: RD Effects of the Gender Quota on Vote Share Gap - Major vs Minor Parties

<i>Panel A: All Candidates</i>			
	Major vs Minor (All Candidates)	KMT vs Minor (All Candidates)	DPP vs Minor (All Candidates)
RD Effect	0.104** (0.051)	0.060 (0.046)	0.086 (0.054)
Control Mean	0.65	0.39	0.24
Observations	276	255	235
Bandwidth	1.19	1.09	0.98
<i>Panel B: Women Candidates Only</i>			
	Major vs Minor (Women Only)	KMT vs Minor (Women Only)	DPP vs Minor (Women Only)
RD Effect	0.157*** (0.050)	0.065 (0.041)	0.101*** (0.037)
Control Mean	0.11	0.05	0.05
Observations	170	211	278
Bandwidth	0.73	0.85	1.20
Bandwidth rule	optimal	optimal	optimal
Covariates	Y	Y	Y
Polynomial	linear	linear	linear

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout and the number of parties. Observations are weighted using the triangular kernel.




Figure A2: Yearly Trend of Women Related Issue Bills and Speeches

Table A12: Keyword and Chinese Translation

Keyword	Chinese	Keyword	Chinese	Keyword	Chinese
abortion	墮胎	marriage	婚姻/結婚	rape	強姦/性侵害
at home with children	在家顧孩子	parental leave	育嬰假	respect women	尊重女性
baby	嬰兒	parenting	育兒	second shift	第二輪班
babysitting	保母	pater est	婚生子女	sex worker	性工作者
birth	出生	pornography	色情/情色	sexual harassment	性騷擾
birth benefit	生育津貼	postnatal	產後	single parent	單親
birth subsidy	生育補助	pregnant	懷孕	stalking	跟蹤
prenatal	產前	subsidy	補助	breast cancer	乳癌
preschool	學前教育	violence	暴力	breastfeeding	哺乳
prostitute	妓女	women	女性/婦女	carer	照顧者
protect women	保護婦女	women victims	女性受害者	childcare	托兒
daycare	日間照顧	double income	雙薪	children	幼兒
compulsory education	義務教育	family allowance	家庭津貼	divorce	離婚
domestic violence	家暴/家庭暴力	family and work	家庭工作	equal pay	同工同酬
family benefit	家庭福利	family subsidy	家庭補助	foreign bride	外籍新娘
foster parent	繼父母	gender	性別	gender-based violence	性別暴力
gender quota	性別配額	human trafficking	人口販運	kindergarten	托兒所/幼兒園
oppress women	受害女性	vaccine	疫苗		

Table A13: Keyword Lists

Keyword	Count	Keyword	Count	Keyword	Count
Kindergarten	1197	Respect women	58	Equal pay	10
Children	1082	Rape	48	Family benefit	9
Women	628	Postnatal	53	Protect women	7
Parenting	312	Birth benefit	37	Family and work	5
Single parent	290	Divorce	35	At home with children	5
Gender	279	Family subsidy	34	Parental leave	4
Childcare	268	Breastfeeding	31	Gender-based violence	3
Pregnant	212	Vaccine	28	Carer	3
Marriage	204	Abortion	27	Oppress women	3
Subsidy	197	Pater est	38	Women victims	3
Daycare	187	Birth	22	Family allowance	2
Domestic violence	164	Prostitute	22	Violence	2
Sexual harassment	164	Stalking	22	Foster parent	1
Babysitting	153	Discrimination	21	Second shift	1
Pornography	126	Foreign bride	15		
Baby	119	Human trafficking	16		
Compulsory education	107	Sex worker	13		
Preschool	63	Birth subsidy	12		

Table A14: Councilor Responses to Gender Quotas

Dependent Variable: Number of Bills and Speeches				
	Baseline	Interaction	Men Only	Women Only
Dynastic (0/1)	−0.160*	0.572*	0.531	0.010
	(0.082)	(0.303)	(0.368)	(0.371)
Quota (0/1)	0.520***	0.564***	0.494***	1.039***
	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.342)
Age (years)	−0.028***	−0.027***	−0.025***	−0.040***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Major Party (0/1)	0.020	0.020	0.029	0.072
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.143)
Women (0/1)	0.506***	0.106		
	(0.083)	(0.310)		
Dynastic × Quota		−0.762**	−0.783**	−0.217
		(0.301)	(0.367)	(0.414)
Women × Dynastic		−0.103		
		(0.169)		
Women × Quota		0.473		
		(0.309)		
Constituency FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,640	5,640	3,948	1,692
R^2	0.300	0.302	0.304	0.441

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The dependent variable is the count of women-related bills and speeches. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects.

Table A15: Councilor Responses to Gender Quotas w/ Education

Dependent Variable: Number of Bills and Speeches				
	Baseline	Interaction	Men Only	Women Only
Dynastic (0/1)	−0.166 (0.101)	0.603 (0.378)	0.421 (0.484)	0.129 (0.375)
Quota (0/1)	0.395** (0.193)	0.451** (0.202)	0.331* (0.197)	1.093*** (0.378)
Education (years)	0.029** (0.014)	0.027* (0.014)	0.025* (0.014)	0.064** (0.029)
Age (years)	−0.034*** (0.005)	−0.034*** (0.005)	−0.033*** (0.006)	−0.042*** (0.011)
Major Party (0/1)	0.009 (0.091)	0.009 (0.091)	0.036 (0.098)	−0.072 (0.196)
Women (0/1)	0.475*** (0.104)	−0.003 (0.376)		
Dynastic × Quota		−0.840** (0.370)	−0.724 (0.480)	−0.297 (0.438)
Women × Dynastic		−0.045 (0.214)		
Women × Quota		0.551 (0.372)		
Constituency FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,566	3,566	2,386	1,180
R^2	0.269	0.271	0.297	0.378

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The dependent variable is the count of women-related bills and speeches. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level, reported in parentheses. All regressions include constituency and year fixed effects.