My dissertation, ''Designing Democracy: How Institutions Shape Political Behavior and Representation in Taiwan,'' uses the Taiwanese case to inform and refine broader theoretical debates about the role of institutions. Over the past century, Taiwan has undergone numerous institutional''experiments,'' including electoral reforms and administrative district rearrangements. These experiments provide a unique context to test general theories of how institutional rules shape strategic behavior and representation. My research shows that institutional incentives affect parties and individuals in predictable ways and that these effects accumulate into durable patterns of representation. It also traces the pathway from institutional inducements to behavioral responses and then to representational outcomes. My papers identify who adapts to institutions, how they adapt, and the duration for which these changes endure. Not only do I explore the predicted implications, but I also examine how institutional changes might have differential effects on specific demographic groups, such as political families and indigenous communities. By uncovering these mechanisms, my dissertation contributes to understanding why such institutions have a differential impact on particular groups and motivates further investigation into the mechanisms underlying these unanticipated outcomes. Centering on causal inference and drawing on a range of statistical methods, the dissertation offers robust and compelling evidence in support of these arguments.
What are the consequences of gender quotas? This paper investigates the impact of Taiwan's gender quota rule in local council elections. The findings show that the quotas not only increased women's descriptive representation but also elevated the presence of dynastic politicians. Leveraging a regression discontinuity design based on the quota thresholds, I provide causal evidence of these shifts in representation. The interplay between a candidate-centered electoral system and a one-quarter gender quota has improved the electoral viability of dynastic candidates and motivated major parties to recruit from political families, thereby reinforcing their dominance in local politics. In addition, gender quotas can enhance substantive representation even when they benefit political groups traditionally perceived as disengaged from women's issues. The growing number of legislative speeches and bill proposals on women's issues suggests a shift toward a greater focus on women's issues in policymaking.
How do members of Congress secure positions on influential committees or attain leadership roles? Although a question receiving substantial academic attention, financial contributions to party organizations, what we term a ”party tax”, has received limited recent analysis. We revisit this mechanism with new data and updated methods by examining member contributions as indicators of willingness and capacity to support party goals financially. Our findings suggest that such contributions are particularly consequential for members occupying elite committee and leadership positions, consistent with theories of concentrated institutional power. Highlighting partisan differences, effects are more pronounced among Republicans. Using change-point analysis, we find formal institutionalization of party dues produced meaningful shifts, particularly among rank-and-file members, rather than codifying existing practices. Addressing causal concerns, we apply coarsened exact matching, showing that members ascending to more powerful positions subsequently increase their party contributions–reinforcing a feedback loop where financial supporters are rewarded with desirable placements. Together, our results underscore a strategic process by which monetary contributions facilitate access to institutional power and further entrench partisan resource flows.
Existing research shows that institutions shape strategic voting, yet most evidence comes from parliamentary democracies. Other types of democracies remain less explored. This study investigates the causal impact of institutional change on strategic voting in Taiwan, a semi-presidential democracy, using a within-country research design. In 2008, Taiwan shifted from a multi-member to a single-member district system for parliamentary elections, while the rules for local council elections remained unchanged. Leveraging this institutional change, I implement a difference-in-differences framework, supplemented by individual-level survey evidence to assess strategic voting under different electoral rules. The results reveal a significant rise in strategic voting following the reform, particularly in districts that experienced larger seat reductions. Survey data further indicate that supporters of minor parties were especially likely to vote strategically or change their party identification. These behavioral shifts appear to be driven primarily by voters rather than by parties, suggesting that individuals responded quickly and adaptively to the new electoral incentives.